Developments in Judicial Jurisprudence by Finnis, John M.
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
Journal Articles Publications
1962
Developments in Judicial Jurisprudence
John M. Finnis
Notre Dame Law School, john.m.finnis.1@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Natural Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. Finnis, Developments in Judicial Jurisprudence, 1 Adel. L. Rev. 317 (1960-1962).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/2
DEVELOPMENTS IN JUDICIAL JURISPRUDENCE
By J. M. FiNIs'
"Implicit in every decision where the question is, so to
speak, at large, is a philosophy of the origin and aim of
law, a philosophy which, however veiled, is in truth the
final arbiter."-CAruoozo J.
Most of us are not so far gone in legal "realism" as to have overcome
the lawyer's traditional reserve towards extra-judicial pronouncements
by Her Majesty's judges. We do not normally regard the political or
philosophical views of the judiciary, in so far as those views are ex-
pressed outside the courts, as of much moment for the law or its
jurisprudence. But this is not just because we disbelieve the extra-
judicial dictum of Holmes J. that law is just "prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact";' nor because we really subscribe to the extra-
judicial ruling of Lord Bacon L.C. that "Judges ought to remember,
that their office is Jus dicere, and not Jus dare".2 It is not even simply
that we hold the opinion which Lord Devlin expressed recently at
Birmingham University, that "the judges of England have rarely been
original thinkers or great jurists". 3 Nevertheless, for whatever reason
it may be, the reserve persists.
Yet it would be unwise to ignore a distinctive movement of thought
manifested among those judges who, since the Second World War,
have cared to articulate their thoughts outside the courts. For this is
a movement which has recently found the words of its most cogent
publicists quietly, without acknowledgment, but quite definitely
adopted in the highest English court, by judges who have taken no
part in its public extra-judicial exposition. It is a movement made
more noticeable by, and best understood by contrast with, the very
different mood of the law schools and universities. The purpose of
this Comment is to explore briefly the fundamentals of what Prof.
H. L. A. Hart has called "the contribution offered by the judges to the
jurisprudence of our day", 4 and to indicate in outline the disparity
between this contribution and those of the most recent academic
writings.
Shaw v. D.P.P.,5 regardless of its practical effect on the adminis-
tration of criminal justice," is a notable case. "Great cases," said
* LL.B. (Adel.).
1. 0. W. Holmes, "Collected Legal Papers" (1920), p. 172.
2. Francis Bacon, "Essays", lvi.
3. Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club of Birmingham University,
17 March, 1961.
4. Letter to "The Times", 12 November, 1960.
5. [19611 2 W.L.R. 897; [19611 2 All E.R. 446.
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Holmes J., "are called great not by reason of their real importance in
shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment."7 And here in Shaw's Case we have what Lord
Radcliffe once called a "classic focus of conflicting points of view",s
It will be remembered that in Shards Case the House of Lords upheld
a conviction for "conspiracy to corrupt public morals", and refrained
from commenting adversely on the opinion of the Court of Criminal
Appeal that the criminal law knows also a common law misdemeanour,
"conduct calculated and intended to corrupt public morals", indepen-
dently of conspiracy.9 Viscount Simonds delivered the leading judg-
ment, in which the seminal passages were as follows:
In the sphere of criminal law I entertain no doubt that there
remains in the courts of law a residual power to enforce the
supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not
only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the
State, and that it is their duty to guard it against attacks which
may be the more insidious because they are novel and unpre-
pared for .... The same act will not in all ages be regarded in
the same way. The law must be related to the changing stan-
dards of life, not yielding to every shifting impulse of the
popular will but having regard to fundamental assessments of
human values and the purposes of society .... Parliament has
not been slow to legislate when attention has been sufficiently
aroused. But gaps remain and will always remain since no one
can foresee every way in which the wickedness of man may
disrupt the order of society. . . . I say, my lords, that if the
common law is powerless in such an event, then we should no
longer do her reverence. . . . There are still, as has recently
been said, "unravished remnants of the common law".10
Viscount Simonds gave no indication of the author of this last remark.
But if we turn to a series of lectures delivered in 1960 by his noble
and learned friend, Lord Radcliffe, and published under the title of
"The Law and Its Compass" a few months before the judgment in
Shaw's Case, we find the following:
The fecundity of democratic assemblies has provided a complex
of detailed rules and regulations governing very many aspects
of the conduct of human life. In each of these rules and regu-
lations we are bound to think that we hear the dim murmur of
the popular will, as children are told that they hear in a shell the
sound of the waves of the sea.... But it would be credulity to
think that. . . the judge has no further duty for the future than
to act as the skilled expounder of statutory prescriptions, sup-
6. Cf. Lord Morris, [1961] 2 W.L.R. 897, 938: "Though it may be that the
occasions for presenting a charge such as that in count I will be in-
frequent .... .
7. Cited in B. N. Cardozo, "Selected Writings", ed. M. E. Hall (1947), p. 84.
8. Radcliffe, op. cit. infra n. 12, p. 47.
9. [1961] 2 W.L.R. 897, 908, 936.
10. [19611 2 W.L.R. 897, 917, 918.
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plemented, where gaps remain, by the still unravished remnants
of the common law .... 11 Unless the law is to equate itself in
the eyes of society with the varying impulses of popular feeling,
as interpreted by these assemblies or the political parties which
dominate them, its conception of the public interest must be
related to some more fundamental assessment of human values
and of the purposes of society. And if it cannot so relate itself
in the modern world, law has ceased to be that pillar of fire
before the moving multitude which men in the past have had
cause to reverence.
12
So we find a central thesis of Lord Radcliffe's public lectures taken
over almost verbatim into the judgment of Viscount Simonds, with
which Lords Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Hodson fully concurred. In
much the same way we can look at Lord Hodson's judgment:
The function of custos morum is in criminal cases ultimately
performed by the jury .... One may take, as an example, the
case of negligence where the standard of care of the reasonable
man is regarded as fit to be determined by the jury. In the
field of public morals it will thus be the morality of the man in
the jury box that will determine the fate of the accused, but this
should hardly disturb the equanimity of anyone brought up in
the traditions of our common law.13
Here, as in all the judgments of the majority in Shaw's Case, we hear
echoes of Lord Devlin's Maccabean Lecture, delivered for the British
Academy in 1959:
How are the moral judgments of society to be ascertained? ...
English law has evolved and regularly uses a standard which
does not depend on the counting of the heads. It is that of the
reasonable man .... For my purpose I should like to call him
the man in the jury box, for the moral judgment of society must
be something about which any twelve men or women drawn
at random might after discussion expect to be unanimous. 14
Thus Shaw's Case, in which the jurisprudence of legal theory merges
insensibly into the jurisprudence of case-law, provides us with more
than sufficient reason to study the extra-judicial utterances of the
judges with an interest both theoretical and practical.
11. It is evident that the "unravished remnants of the common law" do not
stand for the same thing in Viscount Simonds's judgment as in Lord
Radcliffe's opinion. Lord Radcliffe uses the phrase to denote scraps of
positive law of the same determinate status as statute law, while Viscount
Simonds uses the same phrase to denote relatively indeterminate principles,
the content of which is to be filled in by judge or jury, whereby the common
law can continuously adapt itself to new circumstances. Yet the phrase
provides the clue to the source of much else in Viscount Simonds's phrase-
ology, and the ultimate significance of the two passages, taken as a whole,
appears to be the same.
12. Radcliffe, "The Law and Its Compass" (1960), pp. 52-53.
13. [1961] 2 W.L.R. 897, 940.
14. Devlin, "The Enforcement of Morals" (1959), pp. 15-17.
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The thirteen public lectures which Lord Radcliffe has delivered
during the last ten years (and he has published nothing besides) are
devoted to the thesis that law and state alike are grounded on moral
purpose, a thesis which he explores and expounds by way both of the
history of political theory' 5 and of the development of the common
law and its doctrine of public policy. 6 His particular concern in his
more occasional pronouncements is the application of his larger theme
to the theory and practice of censorship.17 Thus Viscount Simonds,
while not at that point employing his very words, truly conveyed Lord
Radcliffe's primary notion when he spoke, in Shaw's Case, of the
supreme and fundamental purpose of the law being to conserve not
only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State.
It is not a popular doctrine. Lord Radcliffe comes to it in the first
of his 1951 Reith Lectures, when he is speaking of Plato:
...for him the question "What do men organise themselves
into society for?" could have only one answer: "To give the
members of society, all the members, the best chance of realising
their best selves." So, in one leap, there is made the big
decision: the State is an organisation which exists for a moral
purpose.' s
And he returns to it at the end of the last of those lectures, by way
of Matthew Arnold (whom he, like Cardozo J., regards as "one of the
most enlightening of authors")19 :
"We want an authority," he says, "and we find nothing but
jealous classes, checks and a deadlock; culture suggests the
idea of the State. We find no basis for a firm State power in our
ordinary selves; culture suggests one to us in our best self." ...
Power, authority, dominion are still with us, they correspond
to something that belongs to a man's inmost self, and men do
themselves no service by thinking or speaking of them as evil
things. Power is good or evil according to the vision that it
serves.
20
In like manner his object in his most recent work was to make a
"teleological inquiry (and from this the mind of every well-constituted
person is trained to shrink)" 21 into "what in the end law stands for
and what are its final purposes".2 2 It is an inquiry which in the end
leads Lord Radcliffe to make explicit what was only hinted at in 1951,
15. See "The Problem of Power" (1951 Reith Lectures) 2nd ed. 1958.
16. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, especially ch. 2.
17. "Freedom of Information: a fundamental human right" (1953 Montagu
Burton Lecture at the University of Glasgow); "Censors" (1961 Rede
Lecture at the University of Cambridge); speech in the House of Lords on
commercial television, 26 May, 1952, 176 Lords Debates 1401-1406. Lord
Radcliffe was Director-General of the U.K. Ministry of Information, 1941-
1945.
18. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 15, p. 23.
19. Cardozo, op. cit. supra n. 7, p. 62.
20. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 15, p. 117.
21. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 4.
22. Ibid.
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namely, his conviction that "we must never lose touch with the idea
of Natural Law or give up the belief that all positive law bears some
relation to it". 23 But Lord Radcliffe's view is not that of a simple
moralist; his subtle and profound examination of the development of
the common law and the present structure of its administration ends
with the remark: "where Lord Mansfield failed the modern radical
jurist is even less likely to succeed.24 You cannot hope to get Natural
Law in at the front door. "25 As he says later, "the principle of Natural
Law was never intended primarily for lawyers";2 6 it was, rather, "meat
for the prince, who has now become the legislative assembly, and the
subject".2 - Nevertheless, the heart of Lord Radcliffe's book is directed
towards the lawyer rather than the plain citizen, for it concerns the
common law doctrine of public policy. The discussion of this cannot
properly be summarised, ranging as it does over the whole meaning
and application of that contentious doctrine, pointing up by the way
the reasons logical, historical and social-psychological for the "in-
creasing reluctance of the Bench to admit a concern with public
policy",2 s and analysing the deficiencies of Parke B.'s classic opinion
in Egerton v. Brownlow29 and of Lord Halsbury's equally famous
judgment in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines.30 In Lord
Radcliffe's own opinion it is "not so much that the judge should with-
draw from the whole ground of public policy as that he should make
a more intensive effort to analyse what its basic requirements are and
to train himself to become a sounder exponent of their intrinsic
nature".31
Every system of jurisprudence needs, I think, a constant pre-
cecupation with the task of relating its rules and principles to
the fundamental moral assumptions of the society to which it
belongs. The doctrine of public policy is capable, rightly under-
stood, of performing part of this service. It is misunderstood if
it is supposed to embody any policy except that of realising the
true ideals of that society. It has nothing to do with the policy
of the government of the day and no inherent connection with
such policies as are pursued from time to time by the legis-
lature. . 2
The great problem, as Lord Radcliffe demonstrates by reference to the
cases on restraint of trade, is to distinguish a "fundamental moral
23. Ibid. at p. 93.
24. This is so, although Shaw v. D.P.P. is an explicit and emphatic re-assertion
of one of Lord Mansfield's broadest principles, and the appeal throughout
the judgments of the majority is to the authority of Lord Mansfield himself:
[1961] 2 W.L.R. 897, 917, 918, 934, 937, 940.
25. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 33.
26. Ibid. at p. 95.
27. Ibid. at p. 33.
28. Ibid. at p. 52.
29. (1853) 4 H.L.C. 1, 123.
30. [19021 A.C. 484.
31. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 47.
32. Ibid. at pp. 63-64.
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assumption" from "a fashion of economic thinking or social philo-
sophy",33 from mere passing considerations of public benefit and
prejudice.34 A tradition of judicial opinion, running from Burrough J.
in Richardson v. Mellish3M in 1824 down to Lord Reid dissenting in
Shaw v. D.P.P.,36 denies in effect that the judges are capable of re-
solving this problem by making the necessary distinction. The basic
theory of judicial capacity and function is evidently here in issue.
Very early in "The Law and Its Compass" Lord Radcliffe stakes out
his ground:
"My duty as a judge," said Justice Cardozo, "may be to objectify
in law not my own aspirations and convictions and philosophies,
but the aspirations and convictions and philosophies of men
and women of my time."37 But then the argument turns round
upon itself, because these same men and women, as I believe,
want the law to stand to them for something which is not just
a reflection of their own philosophies and convictions and
aspirations... rather the impersonal consensus of wisdom than
the excellence of judgment of this lawgiver or that. 38
Nor does Lord Radcliffe stand alone; there is Lord Devlin:
People do not think of monogamy as something which has to
be supported because our society has chosen to organize itself
upon it; they think of it as something that is good in itself and
offering a good way of life and that it is for that reason that
our society has adopted it.3 9
There is, perhaps more cautious, Sir Owen Dixon:
It is an error if it is believed that the technique of the common
law cannot meet the demands which changing conceptions of
justice and convenience make .... The demands made in the
name of justice . . . must proceed, not from political or socio-
logical propensities, but from deeper, more ordered, more
philosophical and perhaps more enduring conceptions of
justice.40
Not long ago there was Lord Macmillan; 41 and there is with us, of
course, Lord Denning, saying of justice: "It is not temporal but
eternal .. .it is what the right-minded members of the community
-those who have the right spirit within them-believe to be fair.."42
And of the law: "It must correspond, as near as may be, with justice.
33. Ibid.
34. Cf. R. v. Todd [1957] S.A.S.R. 305, 321.
35. (1824) 2 Bing. 229, 252.
36. [1961] 2 W.L.R. 871, 923-924.
37. Cardozo, op. cit. supra n. 7, p. 180.
38. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, pp. 11-12.
39. Devlin, op. cit. supra n. 14, p. 11; cf. Hart, "Treason and Immorality", The
Listener, 30 July, 1959, p. 162.
40. "Concerning Judicial Method" (1956) 29 A.L.J. 476.
41. Macmillan, "Law and Other Things" (1937), p. 281.
42. Denning, "The Road to Justice" (1955), p. 4.
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... This conception of the task of the lawyer finds its finest expression
in the words of the judicial oath."43
The view expressed in all these dicta (and these judges seem to
have been left, of late, in virtually unchallenged command of the
field of extra-judicial utterance) is a view which sees the judge as
active in the formulation and application of legal standards, principles
and rules which will translate on to the juristic plane, in particular
litigations, those principles of substantive justice which are regarded
by him and his society as objectively valid. The aim of the judge-
the formal end of his enquiry-is to do justice; and at the same time
justice is conceived of, not as a static or purely formal principle of
impartiality, but as importing positive dictates of right and wrong.
Justice is thus synonymous with natural law, equity or the law of
reason;44 it demands "some vindication of a sense of right and wrong
that is not merely provisional or just the product of a historical
process". 45 When all allowance has duly been made for the stringent
requirements of legal certainty, as manifested in the doctrine of
precedent, it remains true, in this view, that the duties of judge and
legislator are at bottom the same-to do right in particular social
situations:
A priori, the task which is imposed on the judge in determining
the law seems to us to be entirely analogous to that imposed
on the legislator himself. Apart from the consideration (which
is certainly not negligible but is nevertheless of secondary
significance in this context) that judicial research is carried on
with respect to a concrete fact-situation which the law is called
upon to meet, the considerations which ought to guide the
judge are, in the last analysis, of exactly the same character as
those which govern legislative action. For the principal end
sought after is in both cases the same-namely, to satisfy as well
as may be, by means of an appropriate ruling, both justice and
social utility.
46
To agree with this general view of Gny's, as those judges we are
discussing would seem to, is not to be bound at the same time to carry
over into the common law all his particular doctrines of, say, statutory
interpretation. The common law indeed rejected one such doctrine
in Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corpora-
tion 41 and Pye v. Minister of Lands (N.S.W.) :48
The duty of the court is limited to interpreting the words used
by the legislature and it has no power to fill in any gaps
disclosed. 49
48. Ibid. at pp. 8-4. The judicial oath is: "I do swear by Almighty God that
... I will do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this
Realm without fear or favour affection or ill-will."
44. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 25.
45. Ibid. at p. 78.
46. F. G6ny, "M6thode d'Interpr~tation et Sources en Droit Priv6 Positive" (2nd
ed. 1919, reprinted 1954), Vol. II, p. 77; trans. by J. M. Finnis.
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But it would be excessively mechanical to suppose that the law already
provides with precision for every contingency that may arise, and that
there are no gaps which the common law, in the person of the judge,
may not seek to fill by appeal to new principles or by the analogical
extension of settled principles. Where, then, are new principles to be
found, and what considerations are to guide and direct the necessary
analogical reasoning? Once again there is little doubt that the judges
we have mentioned would for the most part accept the opinion we
can trace from Aristotle5" down to G6ny and beyond:
The judge called upon to declare the law, when remedying the
deficiencies and filling the gaps in the formal sources of law
(and thus, indeed, any interpreter of positive law), ought to
reckon with the directions of reason and conscience, in order
to scrutinize the mystery of justice, before coming to examine
the actual and existing state of affairs [cette nature des choses
positive], which will make concrete and exact his analysis [qui
pricisera son diagnostic] and put the principles of reason into
operation. This all adds up to saying that there are principles of
justice over and above the contingencies of facts, and that facts,
although they enable the exact realisation of these principles,
do not exhaust their content.5 1
This is an opinion consistent with, though limited in its effects by, a
strict doctrine of precedent, and with Sir Owen Dixon's insistence on
the maintenance of a "strict and complete legalism" 52 in the face of
"political or sociological propensities" 3 -as Lord Radcliffe observes:
Natural Law is not likely to be more than a minor formative
influence upon the work of the judge. The ground is too fully
occupied for him to have much freedom in which to move.54
It is an opinion which flows easily and consistently from the notions
that the primary purpose of the law, as Lord Wright said, is the "quest
for justice";55 that justice is "an ideal fitness of things"5 6 which the law
is bound to see prevail in human affairs; that "it is not the black-letter
47. [1952] A.C. 189.
48. (1954) 90 C.L.R. 635.
49. (1954) 90 C.L.R. 635, 648.
50. "Nicomachean Ethics", Book V, c. 10 (1137b9-33).
51. G~ny, op. cit. supra n. 46, pp. 100-101; trans. by J. M. Finnis.
52. Swearing-in of Sir Owen Dixon as Chief Justice of the High Court of
Australia, 85 C.L.R. xiv.
53. Supra n. 40.
54. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 94. Cf. also Devlin J. in Carter v. Minister
of Health [1950] 1 All E.R. 904: "In the administration of justice, the
choice always lies between the application of the fixed rule that is designed
to be generally fair and to ensure uniformity of treatment, and the investi-
gation of each case on its merits, leaving the result to the length of the
Judge's foot."
55. Wright, in "Interpretations of Modem Legal Philosophies" (1947), p. 794;.
and see Macmillan, op. cit. supra n. 41, pp. 47, 281.
56. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 95.
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and the king's arms"57 nor even the changing will of Parliament, that
can exhaust the sources of law; that the drive of law is to discern and
make concrete the demands of equity and utility; that the judges are
capable, and entrusted with the task, of distinguishing ethical funda-
mentals from political fashions, of legalistically upholding the one
and eschewing the other; s and that the judicial mind, constantly
measuring the evolving contingencies of social life against those larger
principles of justice on which our society seeks to found itself, is
entitled and even obliged to adapt and develop the common law:
Then it is sought to show that the term in question cannot exist
in law because it has never been heard of before this case. When
did it first enter into the relations of employer and employed?
Could it really have existed since the Road Traffic Act, 1930,
if it did not exist before it? My Lords, I do not know because
I do not think I need to know .... No-one really doubts that
the common law is a body of law which develops in process of
time in response to the development of the society in which it
rules. Its movement may not be perceptible at any distinct
point of time, nor can we always say how it gets from one point
to another; but I do not think that, for all that, we need
abandon the conviction of Galileo that somehow, by some
means, there is a movement that takes place. 59
It will be an aid to precision in understanding the implications of
the movement of thought outlined above if we now examine a
dominant current of academic thinking about the same matters. The
contrast between the outlook of those judges whom we have discussed
and that of writers such as Prof. H. L. A. Hart, Prof. Alf Ross and the
pre-war Gustav Radbruch 6 can best be seen in the analysis of the
idea of justice.
It is evident from what has already been said, that in the view so
far reported "there is at all times and in all places an ideal fitness of
57. Burke, "Tract on the Popery Laws" (1765; Bohn ed. 1854), p. 22.
58. Cf. the subtle dictum of Lord Penzance in Combe v. Edwards (1878)
3 P.D. 142: "Law is, or ought to be, the handmaid of justice, and inflexi-
bility, which is the most becoming robe of the latter, often serves to render
the former grotesque."
59. Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd. [1957] A.C. 555, 591 per
Lord Radcliffe (diss.). Cf. Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932]
A.C. 562, 583: "1 do not think so ill of our jurisprudence as to suppose that
its principles are so remote from the ordinary needs of civilized society and
the ordinary claims it makes upon its members as to deny a legal remedy
where there is obviously a social wrong."
60. To a certain extent Radbruch changed his views after the Second World
War. See L. L. Fuller in (1954) 6 Journal of Legal Education 457, 481.
By treating Ross, Hart and Radbruch together in this context, it is not meant
to be implied that the general jurisprudential approach of these authors is
identical or even similar-it is not. What is ultimately sought to be shown
is the necessary consequence, in an important field of legal philosophy, of a
consistently relativist approach even when this proceeds from differingjurisprudential starting-points.
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things"61 which is justice, so that, granted that the aim of the law is
the attainment of justice, "our human laws are but the copies, more or
less imperfect, of the eternal laws so far as we can read them".
62
Justice is thus a substantive principle, making its own demands on
every legislator or judge who seeks to do justice; in every situation
there is some principle or course of action objectively just, regardless
of what is in the event done under the pressure of subjective beliefs
or desires. In every case justice takes sides, and it is the duty of the
legislature or tribunal to see that its own decision is in favour of the
side with whom justice rests.
But for a growing school of academic jurists, "justice, like legal
certainty, is a non-partisan postulate".63 As Radbruch said:
Justice demands that equals be treated equally, different ones
differently; but it leaves open the two questions, whom to con-
sider equal or different, and how to treat them. Justice deter-
mines only the form of the law. In order to get the content
of the law, a second idea must be added, viz. expediency ...
or suitability for a purpose. . . .However, any answer to the
question of the purpose of the law other than by enumerating
the manifold partisan views about it has proved impossible.6 4
Radbruch here expresses lucidly the essentials later explored by
Professors Ross and Hart. Prof. Ross agrees with Radbruch that
"justice is the specific idea of law" 6 --- in this their view is the same as
that of Lord Radcliffe and like thinkers. But it is for Ross and Rad-
bruch a purely formal idea, and needs a supplement before it can
make substantive demands on the law or guide the process of legal
reasoning:
Justice is equality. But the formal demand for equality as such
does not mean much, and . . . the practical content of the
demands of justice depends on presuppositions lying outside
the principle of equality, namely the criteria determining the
categories to which the norm of equality shall apply .... The
demand for equality is reduced to a demand that all differen-
tiation shall be contingent on general criteria (irrespective of
which they are) .... Justice is no guide for the legislator....
The idea of justice resolves itself into the demand that a
decision shall be the result of the application of a general rule.66
The most complete and subtle exposition of such a conception of
justice is to be found in Prof. Hart's recent book, "The Concept of
Law". There are differences of emphasis and detail, but the funda-
mentals remain the same:
We may say that [the idea of justice] consists of two parts: a
uniform or constant feature, summarised in the precept "Treat
like cases alike [and different cases differently]" and a shifting
61. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 95.
62. Lord Macmillan, quoting J. A. Froude, in op. cit. supra n. 41, p. 281.
63. G. Radbruch, "Legal Philosophy" (1932; trans. by K. Wilk, 1950), p. 108.
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or varying criterion used in determining when, for any given
purpose, cases are alike or different. . . It might be said that
to apply a law justly to different cases is simply to take seriously
the assertion that what is to be applied in different cases is the
same general rule, without prejudice, interest or caprice ...
[But] when we turn from the justice or injustice of the adminis-
tration of the law to the criticism of the law itself in these terms,
it is plain that the law itself cannot now determine what re-
semblances and differences among individuals the law must
recognise if its rules are to treat like cases alike and so be just
• ..and the criteria of relevant resemblances and differences
may often vary with the fundamental moral outlook of a given
person or society.67
Prof. Hart defends his restriction of the word "justice" to this purely
"formal principle" by an appeal to English linguistic usage; 68 as against
the classical usage of the word "justice" to import something like
"giving to each his due",69 Prof. Hart contends that it would be
linguistically "strange" to describe a father's disregard of his moral
obligation or duty to his child as an injustice. But the departure from
ordinary usage involved in such a restriction of the meaning of
"justice" becomes apparent in Prof. Hart's account of "compensatory
justice":
... outside the law there is a moral conviction that those with
whom the law is concerned have a right to mutual forbearance
from certain kinds of harmful conduct. Such a structure of
reciprocal rights and obligations proscribing at least the grosser
sorts of harm.. . [creates] among individuals a moral and, in a
sense, an artificial equality to offset the inequalities of nature
• .. the strong and cunning are put on a level with the weak
and simple. Their cases are made morally alike. Hence the
strong man who disregards morality and takes advantage of his
strength to injure another is conceived as upsetting this equili-
brium or order of equality, established by morals; justice then
requires that this moral status quo should as far as possible be
restored by the wrongdoer.... Thus when laws provide com-
pensation where justice demands it, they recognise indirectly
the principle "Treat like cases alike" by providing for the
restoration, after disturbance, of the moral status quo in which
64. Ibid. at pp. 90, 108, 116.
65. A. Ross, "On Law and Justice" (1958), p. 268; Radbruch, op. cit., p. 73.
66. Ross, op. cit., pp. 268, 272, 274, 280.
67. H. L. A. Hart, "The Concept of Law" (1961), pp. 156, 157, 158.
68. Ibid. at p. 153; and see H. L. A. Hart, "Justice" (1953) 28 Philosophy 348,
850. Hume would seem not to agree with Hart: see "Treatise of Human
Nature" III, ii, I.
69. See, inter alios, Plato, "Republic", 331; Aristotle, "Rhetoric", 1, 9; Cicero,
"De Finibus", V, 23, 65; Augustine, "De Civitate Dei", XIX, 24; Inst. 1, i;
Aquinas, "Summa Theologica", I-1I, 58, 11; Hume, "Treatise of Human
Nature", III, ii, II; J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism" (1863; 1910 ed.), pp. 42,
46; Macmillan, "Law and Other Things" (1937), p. 14; J. Stone, "The
Province and Function of Law" (1946), p. 784; G. Del Vecchio, "Justice"
(1952), p. 67 n. 13, p. 75 n. 29; Hailsham, 1960 Rectorial Address to the
University of Glasgow, p. 12.
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victim and wrongdoer are on a footing of equality and so
alike.70
The very weak, almost metaphorical, sense in which a moral order
puts persons "on a level" or "on a footing of equality", the difficulty
of applying such an analysis to the types of compensation-situation
usually referred to under the rubric of "unjust enrichment", and the
overall admitted "indirectness" with which Prof. Hart's formal prin-
ciple is recognized by the common understanding (and thus the
common usage) of "justice" in even those compensation-situations that
he discusses might well be thought to cast doubt on his view that "the
specific form of excellence attributed to laws which are appraised as
just"7 1 is primarily contained in that formal principle. Another ob-
servation which might be made about the primacy of that formal
principle, which without a "moral status quo" remains an "empty
form",72 is that it denies full meaningfulness to criticism of a moral
system as unjust-for if a set of moral principles must be granted
before we can describe any rule as unjust, there must always be one
set of moral principles beyond the reach of justice. We are thus
involved in an infinite regression, or are forced to adopt a relativist
position whereby a rule (moral or legal) is unjust only from the
point of view of another moral rule, which may equally itself be
unjust from the point of view of the first. One might indeed say, after
Radbruch, that there is thus no true justice nor even any hope of
discovering it, but only manifold partisan views about it. One may
doubt, however, whether the English language is really as obviously
wedded to such a view as Prof. Hart would have us believe.
It becomes plain, moreover, that this conception of justice is in-
capable of forming the dynamic principle of legal reasoning and de-
velopment postulated as the ideal of law by the judicial thinkers whose
views we first examined. As a necessary consequence of restricting
justice to a confessedly empty form, the emphasis in Prof. Hart's
analysis is on justice as "maintaining or restoring a balance or pro-
portion"7 3 already given by an existing social-moral order and upset
by a violation due (though this part of Prof. Hart's analysis does not
seem to follow inevitably from his premisses) to force or fraud. The
emphasis in the opposing point of view is on justice as imposing a
rightful order on conflicting human interests which are by their nature
legitimate opposites not easily reconcilable 74-and only then as main-
taining the established moral order. Prof. Hart recommends Sidgwick's
discussion of justice as one of the two best modem elucidations of the
idea; 75 but while his own discussion embraces three of the four
70. Hart, op. cit. supra n. 67, pp. 160-161.
71. Ibid. at p. 161.
72. Ibid. at p. 155.
73. Ibid.
74. Cf. J. Pieper, "Justice" (1957), p. 63.
75. Hart, op. cit. supra. n. 67, p. 251.
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elements of justice enumerated by Sidgwick 76-namely, Equality or
Impartiality, Reparation for injury and Conservative Justice-he seems
to find no place, even in a linguistic analysis, for Sidgwick's "Ideal
Justice", the principle of which is that "Desert should be requited".
77
It is this view of justice as ultimately "desert" (understood in a
broader sense than in the context of retributive punishment) which
is at the heart of any view proposing justice as a practical guide to
legislator and judge.78 "Give to every man his due"-the principle
brings us immediately face to face with the rational and social nature
and status of man, from which flow his rights78 a and interests which
it is the purpose of society and its officers to respect and promote.
Justice, in this view, is not, as it is for Professors Ross and Hart, a
segment of morality primarily concerned with the ways in which
classes or categories of individuals are treated. 79 For the quest for
justice is not primarily a quest for equal treatment as between persons
inside given classes. It is, rather, a repeated effort to give to every
man what ought to be given to him, what he can rightfully claim, what
is due or owed to him as a rational and social animal. The "pro-
portion" to be imposed and observed is not principally between per-
sons,8 0 but between a man and his own.81 Of course, if justice is every-
where attained-if the quest is successful-a proportionate equality
between persons follows as an inevitable but nevertheless incidental
corollary. Behind the just claims of the particular man whose case
has arisen for consideration can be discerned the claims of all men
in like case. To reduce justice to a consideration of classes of persons
is to evacuate it of its force as the ideal of-the idea giving content to
-the law. For classes, qua classes, have no rights or duties; justice
(as conceived by, say, Lord Radcliffe) grounds in a man, and only
derivatively, and in a weak sense, in the class of like men of which that
man is a member. Justice looks to the likeness of like claims only
after it has recognised the principal claim.
It might be thought that this dispute about the meaning of "justice"
and its status in the critique and formation of law is simply termino-
logical-that the function of "justice" in the jurisprudence of the
76. See H. Sidgwick, "The Method of Ethics" (1890), p. 293.
77. Ibid. at p. xxiii.
78. Cf. Del Vecchio, op. cit. supra n. 69, p. 73 n. 24.
78a. It is difficult to agree with Profs. Olafson and Hart in their contention that
most pre-seventeenth century natural law thinkers did not work with the
notion of natural rights, but rather with the notion of natural duties. See
F. A. Olafson, "Society, Law and Morality" (1961), p. 22, and H. L. A.
Hart, "Are there any Natural Rights?" (1955) 64 Phil. Rev. 175, 182,
reproduced in Olafson, op. cit., p. 173, 178. The idea of natural human
rights was much closer to the surface of mediaeval thinking than the above
contention implies. See Aquinas, "Summa Theologica", II-I, 57, and
Pieper, op. cit. supra n. 74, ch. 1.
79. See Hart, op. cit. supra n. 67, p. 163; Ross, op. cit. supra n. 65, pp. 272-273.
80. Cf. Hart, op. cit., pp. 155, 251.
81. Cf. Aquinas, "Summa Theologica", 11-1I, 58, 10 resp.; and see infra at n. 89.
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judges could be fulfilled in the jurisprudence of the academics by,
say, "common morality",8 2 "accepted social morality and wider moral
ideals""s or some such principle more general and potentially less
formal in character than their notion of "justice". But in fact we have
used the discussion about justice only as a pointer to the more funda-
mental disagreements between the two schools of thought. For the
one view is dependent on its contention that there is an "ideal fitness
of things" which can in some sense be read off from the "nature of
things", in particular the "rational and social" nature of man"--other-
vise it quite fails to give content to the principle "To each his due",.
and begs the question when it speaks of imposing a "rightful order"
on conflicting human interests; it fails, moreover, in its attempt to go
beyond the "convictions and philosophies of men and women of my
time" into the realn of the "impersonal consensus of wisdom", the
"good in itself", the "eternal". And the other view of justice, likewise,
depends for its cogency on its contention that the content of the
"moral status quo" is indeterminate and variable, that we can hope for
nothing more than "manifold partisan views" about the purposes
which (as all sides admit) give content to the law; for if the criterion
used in determining when cases are alike or different were not by its
very nature shifting, varying and "open to challenge even in relation
to a single type of subject",8 5 the empty and formal principle "treat
like cases alike . . . " could have no claim to be peculiarly "the general
principle latent in [the] diverse applications ot the idea of justice.",6
In other words, any view like that of Lord Radcliffe stands or falls (if
it is consistent) with the view that ethical judgments are rational and
verifiable in character, while the opposing view here discussed stands
or falls, professedly in the case of Radbruch and Ross and by necessary
implication in the case of Prof. Hart,s 7 with the view that ethical
judgments are, shortly, subjective, relative or noncognitive. And this
is not an issue for the jurist, qua jurist, to decide.
We can use the problem of justice to throw still more light on
juristic debate. In Prof. Hart's interpretation, Aristotle exhibited
justice as specifically concerned with the maintenance or restoration
82. Hart, op. cit. supra n. 4.
83. Hart, op. cit. supra n. 67, p. 199.
84. See Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 95.
85. Hart, op. cit. supra n. 67, p. 156; the phrase "open to challenge" is, of
course, ambiguous; any truth is open to challenge in its ("accidental")
aspect as proposition, though in its ("essential") aspect of truth it is not
open to challenge. In the present context Prof. Hart appears to mean, like
Radbruch and Ross, that the criterion is essentially open to challenge, i.e.
that there is no true criterion to be found.
86. Ibid. at p. 155.
87. Cf. Prof. Hart's reluctance to associate positivism in law with relativism or
noncognitivism in ethics: "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals"
(1958) 71 Harv. L. R. 591, 624-629.
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of a balance or proportion between persons.8 8 Like Prof. Hart, St.
Thomas Aquinas claims the support of Aristotle, but he interprets
Aristotle as exhibiting justice as specifically concerned with balance
or proportion between a person and some act or thing due to him.89
An examination of the Nicomachean Ethics indicates that both inter-
pretations are, in a sense, right. Aristotle's analysis is indeed con-
cerned with equality as between persons; persons in like case have a
right in justice to an equal share of any whole. But this is only after
he has said:
Awards should be "according to merit"; for all men agree that
what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some
sense, though they do not specify the same sort of merit, but
democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of
oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of
aristocracy with excellence. 90
Because Aristotle does not here look beyond the manifold partisan
views, he concentrates on describing the division of the "good" or
"loss and gain" or other whole into parts which are to one another as
are the given merits or given equality of the persons concerned. It is
a description that Aquinas would doubtless accept; but because
Aquinas thinks he is capable of going beyond manifold partisan views
and finding the objective merits of a man, the emphasis of his dis-
cussion shifts to the question "What does this man merit; what is due
to him"? The point of view is no longer simply that of the observer
describing the usage of "justice" among men with manifold partisan
views; it has become that of the man who has to decide what is just
in a certain situation. Over and above Aristotle's account (which we
shall call "external") of men doing justice according to their own
specifications of merit, we have Aquinas's account (which we shall
call "internal") of the problem of justice as it must be resolved by
everyone who would do justice, the problem of determining the true
merits of a man. It is not that the "external" account is wrong or
superseded as an account of the meaning of "justice", but that the
meaning of "justice" in the understanding of someone doing justice
has additional elements which the "internal" account seeks to explore.
Now failure to distinguish between "external" and "internal"
accounts of the same matter has long confused jurisprudential thought.
Everyone is agreed that "law" imports "obligation"-but discussions
of the nature of obligation (and thus of law itself) have too often
bogged down because one side was giving an "external" account while
the other was attempting an "internal" account of the same idea. The
88. Hart, op. cit. supra n. 67, p. 251.
89. Supra n. 81.
90. Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics", V, 3 (1131a27). But cf. Aristotle's later
view in "Rhetoric", 1, 9, 13, 15.
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"external" account is an answer to the question "When, in a given
society, are rules conceived and spoken of as imposing obligations?"9'
The answer will be in some such descriptive terms as "when the
general demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure
brought to bear upon those who deviate or threaten to deviate is
great."92 Other phenomena characteristic of obligation may also be
referred to; thus Prof. Hart shows that statements of obligation (e.g.
"A has an obligation to do X") have an external aspect (in terms of
observable regularities in the conduct of A and of officials in the
society, predictions of probable social reaction against A if he fails
to do X, etc.) and an internal and more characteristic aspect (asserting,
not a prediction, but that A's case falls under a certain rule of the
given system)." But such an account of the social and linguistic
phenomena associated with the word "obligation" remains an "external"
account; it rests content with description, and does not pretend to be
a guide or justification to anyone who wishes to know whether and why
he has an obligation to do X. But the "internal" account, while not
necessarily questioning the adequacy or accuracy of the "external"
account as a description, seeks to assist the person to decide whether
or not he really has an obligation to do X. It seeks to answer the
question "Why does this law manage to impose an obligation to do X
on me? How is it that I am not just asked or under pressure or forced
but also under an obligation to do X?" This question cannot be
answered simply by describing linguistic usage or social phenomena of
command or custom, or by referring to the fact that the jurist can
postulate a Grundnorm from which the legal rule commanding me to
do X can be deduced,94 or to the fact that a "rule of recognition"
identifying that rule as legal is accepted and used as a guide to conduct
by any person or number of persons.95 The question means "Why
ought I to do X?" and it is hardly necessary to call in Hume to remind
us that no conclusion in ethical form can follow immediately from a
simple recital of empirical facts-something more is required. Nor can
the question be answered by pointing to a set of moral rules and saying
"those moral rules require me to obey the law" or "X is in accordance
with those moral rules". For the question means "What is it about
those moral rules and about the law which requires me, in conscience,
to do X?" The answer can only be in some such terms as that the
purpose of the legal system is to promote the purposes of society, and
that society ought to be preserved and developed for the good of man
and that I ought not to subvert the good of myself or my fellow men.
91. Cf. Hart, op. cit. supra n. 67, p. 84.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid. at p. 86.
94. Cf. H. Kelsen, "General Theory of Law and State" (1949), pp. 110-124.
95. Cf. Hart, op. cit. supra n. 67, pp. 92-107.
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It follows that if X is indubitably inimical to the purposes of society
or the good of man, any legal direction to do X will lack the quality
of obligation imported by conformity with social purposes which
promote or are consistent with the good of man. In this purely "in-
ternal" sense the legal direction will lack a quality which laws normally
have for their subjects, and to this extent will not be law. From the
"external" point of view it is certainly a fruitful and revealing
tautology 6 that "the existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit
is another". 97 The statement, lex injusta non est lex, is certainly absurd
if taken as part of an "external" account of the nature of law, and
misleading if regarded as a definitional fiat; but it is not in fact, and
was never meant to be, more than a forceful, almost hyperbolical way
of expressing the necessary consequence of any "internal" inquiry into
the source of obligation and of law.9s For it is plainly impossible for
me to regard myself as being at one and the same time under an
objective obligation (arising from a legal rule) to do X and under an
objective obligation (arising from a moral principle) not to do X.
There is only one way to escape such a dilemma; that is by denying
that law has any of that obligatory character which the "internal"
inquiry would lead us to suppose that it has. No grounds can be
adduced for such a denial of the objective moral justification and
force of law that will not lead also to the denial of objective or cog-
nitive status to morality itself. Once the question is asked and the
"internal" inquiry begun, the logic of its answer is inexorable unless
it can be shown that the question is one which permits of no rational
answer. Once again we stray beyond the bounds of jurisprudence into
philosophy, and our meta-ethics will determine the matter.
Of course, attempts might be made to deny the relevance of the
"internal" inquiry. It is easy enough for the observer analysing the
phenomenon of law, and for the advocate whose purpose and justifi-
cation is established for him, 99 to disregard the "internal" inquiry.
But the legislator, the judge on the frontier of legal development, and
the citizen called upon to submit himself to the law-all these will
vant to ask what the law ought rightly to be or to become, in the light
96. See Hart, op. cit. supra n. 87, p. 600.
97. J. Austin, "The Province of Jurisprudence Determined" (1832; ed. H. L. A.
Hart 1954), p. 184.
98. It is not to be forgotten, when considering the phrase, lex injusta non est
lex, that that dictum is not intended to deny either that the benefit of any
doubt ought to rest with the State, or that an unjust law may in certain
circumstances remain obligatory by virtue of the moral need to preserve
the peace and order of the State by obedience. The claims made on con-
science may be very complex.
99. Cf. Ross, op. cit. supra n. 65, p. 377: "Like other technologists [the lawyer]
simply places his knowledge and skill at the disposal of others, in his case
those who hold the reins of political power". And that is the end of Ross's
book.
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of its purpose, and whether and why it ought rightly to be obeyed.""'
To such questions the "bare dissections" 1° 1 and descriptions of the,
"external" analyst will give no answer.
The two movements of thought we have been discussing could fairly
be regarded as representing two conceptions of the nature and status
of what Roscoe Pound, after Josef Kohler, 1° 2 called the jural postulates
of a society. 1'0 3 Lord Radcliffe would say that the jural postulates of
a society are rather ideal than pragmatic; 10 4 that they are not accepted
or acted upon for their own sake, but rather because they are thought
to reflect as best as men can an objective rightness of things grounded
in the nature of men and discernible by rational inquiry. But in the
other conception, the jural postulates which give content to the idea of
justice and which guide the "creative activity" 10 5 necessitated by the
"open texture of law"'10 are indeed postulates, to be recognised by
the jurist simply because they are the received aspirations and con-
victions of the society; their existence is pragmatic, a question of
observable social-psychological facts, rather than ideal.
What we are looking for is the ideal relation among men which,
when we have formulated it as an idea, will give a guide for
legislation, a sure ground for choosing from among conflicting
or competing starting points for legal reasoning, a touchstone
of interpretation and a pathfinder in the application of legal
standards. The nineteenth century had such a formula but we
are giving it up.10 7
In this both sides would agree; but whereas the one would regard the
search as truly inspired by the belief that there is an ideal relation
and a sure ground to be found, the other would contend that the
search cannot end, even in theory, in anything more than manifold
partisan views. One might be excused for thinking that, in the long
run, the search is likely to be prosecuted with greater vigour by those
100. Cf. Radbruch's view that obligation cannot be founded on power, but only
on a value inherent in the law; only compulsion can be founded on power.
Radbruch held this view both before and after the Second World War (see
Radbruch, op. cit. supra n. 63, p. 84 and supra n. 60). The shift in his
views involved simply the elevation of "justice" above "certainty" and
"'expediency" in the hierarchy of elements of the idea of law. The general
significance of this shift can easily be over-emphasised; cf. Radbruch, op. cit.
supra n. 63, pp. 107-112.
101. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 9.
102. J. Kohler's Rechtspostulate; discussed by Stone, op. cit. supra n. 69, pp.
331-340.
103. See R. Pound, "Jurisprudence" (1959), Vol. 3, pp. 1-17; Pound, "The Ideal
Element in Law" (1958) pp. 176-195; Stone, op. cit., pp. 355-368.
104. Stone, op. cit., pp. 359-360, appears to over-emphasise the pragmatic
character of jural postulates in Pound's conception; cf. Pound, "The Ideal
Element in Law", p. 186. The truth may wen be, however, that Pound's
conception is essentially ambiguous as between the alternative ways of
consistently defining jural postulates, discussed in the text above.
105. Hart, op. cit. supra n. 67, p. 200.
106. Ibid. at pp. 124-132, 200.
107. Pound, "The Ideal Element in Law", p. 175.
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who regard its end and object as not utterly beyond the power of
human reason; that the law will more confidently relate itself to funda-
mental assessments of human values (and eschew the shifting impulses
of popular will and judicial eccentricity) x1 0 if it regards those assess-
ments as valid and right as well as fundamental; that the function of
the law as moral guardian will be more confidently upheld by judges
who think they can see, behind the de facto moral status quo, the real
moral welfare of the State; and that the common law doctrine of public
policy will be applied with greater assurance, awareness and (it may
be) sophistication by judges who believe that there are true and
accepted ends and values to be found independently of current
political and social doctrines concerning means and method. If this
is indeed so, then the implications of the movements of thought we
have discussed are not solely academic.
If we follow up the quotation from Pound made above, we find a
clue to further implications in the thinking of the judges. Pound
continued:
In the past the ideal relation among men has been thought of
successively in three ways .... Third, the ideal relation among
men has been put as liberty .... Now that after a century of
substantial agreement on the third we are agreeing to give it
up we may hardly expect to find a generally acceptable sub-
stitute at once.109
It is certainly the aim of Lord Radcliffe in his discussion both of public
policy and of censorship to discountenance any view which sees free-
dom of contract as the "master freedom overshadowing all others"'110
and freedom of expression as an inalienable and unfettered human
right."' "For there are manifestations of freedom of contract that
prejudice and even defeat other freedoms no less important to a
civilized and fruitful life."'1 2 Once the liberty of the free-willing
individual, 1 1 which so dominated the nineteenth century theory of
contract (and indeed of society and justice), is replaced as the received
social ideal by a positive conception of the civilized life, and, one
might say, of "social justice" (the content of which we need not here
stay to consider, and as a means towards which individual liberties
may of course be indispensable), 1 14 a theoretical basis is established
for contractual doctrines to develop unfettered by the need to postulate
fictitious "implied" terms "agreed upon" by contracting parties en-
108. Cf. the demand of Lord Atkin that public policy be invoked only "in clear
cases in which the harm to the public is substantially incontestable, and
does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inferences of a few judicial minds":
Fender v. St. John-Mildmay [1938] A.C. 1, 12.
109. Pound, "The Ideal Element in Law", p. 175
110. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra, n. 12, p. 61.
111. See n. 17 supra.
112. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 60.
113. See Stone, op. cit. supra n. 102, pp. 241-264.
114. See Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 95.
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dowed with a notional omniscience. It is wholly significant that Lords
Radcliffe and Wright, whose general jurisprudence of law and justice
we have discussed above, should in their judicial capacity have led
the attack on the theory that frustration of contracts proceeds on the
basis of an implied intention of the contracting parties. In Denny,
Mott and Dickson Ltd. v. Fraser,115 Lord Wright said:
It is not possible, to my mind, to say that if they had thought
of it they would have said: "Well, if that happens, all is over
between us." On the contrary, they would almost certainly on
the one side or the other have sought to introduce reservations
or qualifications or compensations. As to that the Court cannot
guess. What it can say is that the contract either binds or does
not bind.116
Outside the court he was more outspoken:
The truth is that the Court or jury as a judge of fact decides the
question in accordance with what seems to be just and reason-
able in its eyes. The judge finds in himself the criterion of what
is reasonable. The Court is in this sense making a contract for
the parties, though it is almost blasphemy to say so. 1 17
Lord Radcliffe was perhaps even more forthcoming in Davis Con-
tractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council:
By this time it might seem that the parties themselves have
become so far disembodied spirits that their actual persons
should be allowed to rest in peace. In their place there rises the
figure of the fair and reasonable man, and the spokesman of the
fair and reasonable man, who represents after all no more than
the anthropomorphic conception of justice, is and must be the
court itself.""
It is equally significant that it should have been Lords Wright and
Denning who have consistently formulated and sought to expand the
shaky common law doctrine of quasi-contract in terms of unjust
enrichment."l 9 . And, on the other hand, it cannot but be noticed
that Lord Sumner, who at the height of judicial positivism poured
scorn on "that vague jurisprudence sometimes attractively styled
justice between man and man", 20 did his best in Sinclair v.
Brougham121 to stifle the notion of quasi-contract; and that Scrutton
L.J., who seemed to allow in Luther v. Sagor122 unrestricted omni-
115. [1944] A.C. 265.
116. [1944] A.C. 265, 275.
117. Wright, "Legal Essays and Addresses" (1939), p. 259.
118. [1956] A.C. 696, 728. But cf. Radcliffe, op. cit. supra n. 12, p. 8: "Some
writers have claimed to find in the legal norm of the 'reasonable man' an
anthropomorphic embodiment of the Law of Reason. For myself I doubt
it: I think him too earth-bound at many points."
119. Wright, op. cit. supra n. 117, pp. 1-33; Fibrosa Case [1943] A.C. 32, 61
per Lord Wright; Nelson v. Larholt [1948] 1 K.B. 339, 343 per Denning J.
120. Baylis v. Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch. 127, 140.
121. [1914] A.C. 398, 452.
122. [1921] 3 K.B. 532, 559.
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potence in the English sovereign, carried on in Holt v. Markham1
23
the attack on Lord Mansfield's doctrine of quasi-contract.
Wherever we look, whether to criminal law, contract or tort, the
movement of thought manifested in the extra-judicial utterances we
first noticed has notable ramifications in the living development of the
common law. It is the same Lord Denning who says that justice is
eternal and who promises that, given the opportunity, he will an-
nounce a right of action in tort for invasion of privacy.12 4
123. [1923] 1 K.B. 504, 513.
124. 229 Lords Debates, 637-640 (13 March, 1961). And see now the trenchant
comments of Lord Denning, on the bases of equity jurisdiction, in Campbell
Discount Co. Ltd. v. Bridge [1962] 2 W.L.R. 439, 458, a case casting the
gravest doubt on the validity of one of the most frequent provisions in
the ordinary hire-purchase contract. And compare the cautious reservations
of Lords Radcliffe and Devlin, at 455 and 463, with the outright opposition
to Lord Denning's views of Viscount Simonds and Lord Morton of Henryton,
at 442 and 445. A comprehensive, but analytically unsatisfactory, study
of the attitudes of English common lawyers to justice is to be found in a
book which reached me after this article was written: see F. E. Dowrick,
"Justice according to the English common lawyers" (1961).

